BEIJING — Li Keqiang is taking his final bow as China's premier after spending a decade under Chinese President Xi Jinping, signaling a change from the skilled technocrats who have helped lead the world's second-largest economy to officials more well-known for their unwavering loyalty to China's most powerful leader in recent memory.

Li's final significant responsibility before retiring was to deliver the state of the nation address to the rubber-stamp parliament on Monday after leaving the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee of the ruling Communist Party in October despite still being under retirement age. Although it contained little new information, the report aimed to reassure citizens about the resilience of the Chinese economy.

When Xi began to amass ever-greater power and elevated the military and security apparatus in support of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," Li—once seen as a potential top leader—became more and more marginalized. It was sometimes difficult to remember that Li was nominally ranked No. 2 in the party due to his lack of visibility.

Li was a premier who was "largely kept out of the spotlight by order of the boss," according to Steve Tsang, director of the China Institute at the London University School of Oriental and African Studies and a longtime follower of Chinese politics.

The fact that Li wasn't just seen as a Xi supporter may end up being "the main reason why he will be remembered fondly" in an era where personal loyalty triumphs over all, according to Tsang.

For the majority of his career, Li was regarded as a cautious, competent, and highly intelligent bureaucrat who was bound by a consensus-oriented Communist Party that instinctively suppresses dissent and who rose through its ranks.

Li squelched reporting on an AIDS outbreak linked to illegal blood-buying rings that purportedly worked with the cooperation of local officials to pool plasma and re-inject it into donors after removing the blood products in the 1990s while serving as governor and later party secretary of the densely populated agricultural province of Henan.

Even though Li wasn't in charge when the scandal started, his administration tried to put a stop to it, discouraged victims from seeking compensation, and harassed individuals who were advocating for orphans and other impacted parties.

Li was an English-speaking politician from a period when liberal Western ideas were more widely accepted. He was admitted to Peking University on his own merits and worked for Hu Jintao's Communist Youth League. He displayed an unusual level of candor when he informed diplomats that statistics for Chinese economic growth were "man-made" and that more reliable indicators included the amount of lending, the demand for electricity, and rail cargo traffic.

Li was an English-speaking politician from a period when liberal Western ideas were more widely accepted. He entered Peking University on his own merits and started working at the Communist Youth League, which was run by Hu Jintao, the future president and party chief.

Although the leadership settled on Xi, the son of a former vice premier and party elder, as the consensus candidate, he was thought to be Hu's preferred successor as president.

Li displayed an unusual level of candor when he informed diplomats that Chinese economic growth figures were "man-made" and that more reliable indicators included lending, rail cargo traffic, and electricity demand.

He made speeches and appeared in public, but he largely failed to use the platforms that were given to him, and he remained largely unnoticed throughout the turmoil of China's three-year conflict with COVID-19.

Xi is not the first among equals, according to Cheng Li, a Brookings Institute expert on Chinese leadership; rather, he is far above equals. Li was a "team player" who prioritized maintaining party unity, but as Xi gradually transferred more of the State Council's authority to party institutions, his influence was being reduced. At the current Congress meeting, it is anticipated that this shift will take place on a much larger scale.

Li Qiang, a close friend of Xi from his time in the provincial government, has taken over as Li Keqiang's replacement. Li Qiang is well-known for his ruthless implementation of the COVID-19 lockdown in Shanghai. Major concerns about the future of the private sector and broader economic reforms supported by Li and his group remain in the wake of his departure. In contrast to Xi's ideological tone, Li Qiang has a more economically oriented perspective on governance.

According to Carl Minzner, a specialist in Chinese law and government, Li may be remembered less for his accomplishments and more for the fact that he was the final technocrat to hold a position of power at the top of the Chinese Communist Party. His departure signals the end of an era in which performance and expertise were the main criteria for career advancement for ambitious officials aiming for higher office. Because of Xi's authoritarian tendencies, elite politics may resume the brutal, unstable, and convoluted practices of the Mao era.