New Delhi - Smaller yet strategically vital nations often become arenas of competition for larger powers striving for regional dominance, and the Republic of Maldives, or simply Maldives, is no exception. Despite its population of less than half a million and a land area barely touching 300 square kilometers, Maldives remains a focal point in geopolitics due to its proximity to crucial maritime trade routes and its involvement in the rivalry between China and India. The recent presidential election, which saw the victory of the pro-China candidate Mohamed Muizzu, has once again thrust Maldives into the global spotlight, capturing the attention of foreign policy experts worldwide.
Traditionally, Maldives, renowned for its pristine tropical beaches and tourist appeal, has been considered within India's sphere of influence. It lies just 70 nautical miles from India's Minicoy Island and 300 nautical miles from India's Western Coast. Maldives' location in the northern Indian Ocean places it squarely in the vicinity of waters patrolled and influenced by the Indian Navy. India shares deep-rooted cultural, ethnic, and political ties with Maldives that span centuries.
This is well reflected in official statements and government documents from India. In a document dated June 3, 2023, India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) declares that "India holds a pre-eminent position in the Maldives," with extensive ties across various domains.
India has, through its naval capabilities, consistently been among the first to offer assistance to Maldives during natural disasters, such as the 2004 Tsunami and the 2014 water crisis. Additionally, India has flexed its military muscle in Maldives by supporting the government against an attempted military coup in 1988, maintaining a small military presence in the island nation.
The recent victory of Mohamed Muizzu, a pro-China candidate, in the presidential election is likely to bring about significant changes in regional dynamics. Muizzu, who secured 54 percent of the vote in the runoff election, centered his campaign on the "India Out" platform. Considered an ally of former Maldives president Abdulla Yameen, another pro-China leader, Muizzu has portrayed the Indian military presence in Maldives as an infringement on the country's sovereignty. It is safe to say that the goodwill India enjoyed under President Solih's leadership for the past five years is likely to wane in favor of China.
President Solih pursued a cautious stance toward China in recent years. China has expressed interest in a free-trade agreement with Maldives, a proposition that may appear counterintuitive given China's economic might with a USD 17 trillion economy compared to Maldives' USD 5 billion. Solih has effectively stalled progress on this deal, keeping it in a state of limbo.
With Muizzu poised to assume leadership in the near future, discussions regarding the free-trade agreement may gain momentum.
The global phenomenon of the 'Chinese debt trap' is well-documented, where China extends significant loans to smaller nations, subsequently leveraging debt to acquire strategic assets. Maldives need not look far from its own shores to witness this strategy in action, as seen in China's 99-year lease of Sri Lanka's Hambantota port.
Contrary to the perception that Maldives merely serves as an outpost for India's security interests, India has been actively involved in infrastructure development projects in the country. Over the years, India has provided numerous opportunities for Maldivian citizens in fields like education and healthcare, while also offering training to Maldivian security officials in Indian military academies and encouraging young Maldivians to explore opportunities in India.
China's appeal, particularly its rapid completion of infrastructure projects, has garnered favor among underdeveloped nations in Asia and Africa. These countries prioritize meeting their basic requirements over speculative analyses of global geopolitics. India has made strides in this regard but is often criticized for its slow progress. To match its strategic ambitions with tangible results, India needs to streamline its efforts. China's deeper pockets provide a distinct advantage, necessitating India to navigate this space more effectively.
In the South Asian context, India's self-perception as the 'big brother' has sometimes caused unease among SAARC nations (excluding Pakistan) during negotiations. India should assess whether its assertiveness in these dealings has cumulatively fostered anti-India sentiment among political elites in countries that previously maintained strong, friendly ties with India. For astute politicians seeking a platform in these nations, blaming India for entrenched issues can be politically advantageous. Such a narrative may resonate with the public, akin to anti-incumbency sentiments, but focused on India as a foreign power. Has this sentiment taken root in Maldives? Thorough ground reporting may be necessary to draw definitive conclusions.
For India, losing goodwill in Maldives can have significant repercussions, particularly in light of China's 'String of Pearls' strategy. While completely eliminating Indian influence in South Asia may be unattainable, recent developments have demonstrated China's gradual encroachment and gains in India's backyard.
As China solidifies its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, it seeks to create a defensive barrier against a potential Indian strategy of blocking the Strait of Malacca, which could disrupt China's oil supply in the event of a conflict. Not long ago, this strategy was considered a potent deterrent against Chinese aggression across India's northern border. However, with China strengthening its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, the efficacy of the Malacca Strait strategy appears diminished.
Developments in Maldives should not be underestimated. After the Hambantota incident, India cannot afford to see the establishment of a Chinese base, even under the guise of commercial interests, in waters bearing India's name.