In March, the United States and China resumed semi-official nuclear arms talks for the first time in five years, with Chinese representatives assuring their U.S. counterparts that they would not use nuclear threats over Taiwan.
According to two American delegates, China conveyed confidence in prevailing in a conventional conflict over Taiwan without resorting to nuclear weapons. The discussions were part of "Track Two" talks, which involve former officials and academics who can authoritatively discuss their governments' positions, distinct from "Track One" official negotiations.
The U.S. delegation, comprising former officials and scholars, met with Chinese scholars and analysts, including former People's Liberation Army officers, in Shanghai. A State Department spokesperson acknowledged that such informal talks could be beneficial, though they don't replace formal negotiations requiring authoritative participation on compartmentalized issues within the Chinese government.
Despite resuming formal "Track One" talks briefly in November, those discussions have stalled. The Pentagon has estimated a 20% increase in China’s nuclear arsenal between 2021 and 2023 and expressed concerns about China's potential nuclear use if faced with a conventional military defeat in Taiwan.
China, which has stepped up military activity around Taiwan in recent years, has never renounced the use of force to bring the island under its control.
The Track Two talks resumed after the Trump administration halted funding in 2019. They resumed on broader security and energy issues post-COVID-19, with the Shanghai meeting focusing on nuclear weapons and posture. David Santoro, who organized the talks, noted frustrations on both sides but indicated plans for further discussions in 2025.
William Alberque from the Henry Stimson Centre emphasized the importance of continuing talks with China amid strained relations. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates China currently has 500 operational nuclear warheads, expected to exceed 1,000 by 2030, compared to 1,770 and 1,710 for the U.S. and Russia, respectively.
China’s nuclear arsenal, modernized since 2020, includes a "nuclear triad" of land, air, and sea-based weapons.
A key U.S. concern was whether China still adhered to its no-first-use and minimal deterrence policies. Chinese delegates affirmed these policies, denying any interest in nuclear parity or superiority with the U.S. This stance was corroborated by U.S. delegate Lyle Morris from the Asia Society Policy Institute. Santoro mentioned a report on the discussions is being prepared for the U.S. government but will not be public.
Despite these semi-official talks, top U.S. arms control official Bonnie Jenkins stated that China had not responded to risk reduction proposals from last year's formal talks. Beijing has not agreed to further government-to-government meetings. The State Department expressed concerns about China's nuclear build-up and its no-first-use policy's ambiguity.
China's Track Two delegation avoided specifics on its modernization efforts, which Alberque noted are characterized by "risk and opacity." Morris added that U.S. delegates were told China’s nuclear modernization aims to deter improved U.S. missile defenses and strengthened alliances. A Chinese delegate highlighted vulnerabilities in China's nuclear weapons to U.S. strikes, suggesting an insufficient second-strike capability.