Beijing: The recent disengagement along the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC) marks a significant milestone for India’s national resolve, underscoring both progress and the stark military capability gaps between India and China, which continue to widen.

First, the resilience of Indian troops at these high-altitude locations, maintaining a firm stance against Chinese forces, stands as a powerful statement. It also reflects the impact of extensive infrastructure development along the Himalayan borders over the past decade. Without these advancements, India wouldn’t have been able to rapidly deploy additional forces, including an entire strike corps with armor, mechanized units, ammunition, and support to these heights. The ongoing supply and support for over 60,000 troops at altitudes of 14,000 to 17,000 feet exemplifies the concerted efforts of the government, Army, engineers, and contractors in enhancing operational readiness.

While this moment deserves recognition, India must brace for a likely repeat of standoffs with China in the coming three to four years—a recurring pattern since 2013 that aligns with Xi Jinping’s tenure. Xi’s leadership has been marked by a decisive shift away from the post-1993 peace agreements along the LAC, with China leveraging its growing military advantage to challenge India’s position.

Since the first Depsang incident in 2013, followed by Demchok in 2016 and Doklam in 2017, China has consistently sought to assert its strength. The 2020 incursions in eastern Ladakh, likely spurred by India’s move to alter Jammu and Kashmir’s status and assert control over Aksai Chin, were a pointed reminder of the capability gap. Xi appears to have interpreted India’s accelerated infrastructure projects and troop deployments as signals to assert dominance, moving his forces to highlight the costs India incurs to protect its territory—a financial burden India has shouldered to avoid territorial losses.

The increased focus on the China front has also necessitated a realignment of India’s forces across two active borders. Troops initially designated for offensive operations into Pakistan’s plains have been redeployed to the western Himalayan heights. Similarly, forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Jammu, Poonch, and Rajouri have been moved, with Pakistani infiltrators exploiting this temporary shift. To counter these incursions, strike formations from the Pakistan frontier have been repositioned. Additionally, a division has been relocated to the central sector as the core of a new China-focused corps along the Uttarakhand frontier.

In contrast, China faces no equivalent active fronts, allowing it the flexibility to treat its forces largely as a strategic reserve. This enables China to operate without the immediate demands of multi-front deployments, a luxury India does not currently share.