Washington: A cloud of mystery and alarm now hangs over Iran’s nuclear program after targeted airstrikes by the United States and Israel devastated three of Iran’s most critical nuclear facilities. The offensive, which included the use of powerful bunker-buster bombs, destroyed key enrichment sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan but left unanswered questions about the fate of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles.
Former US President Donald Trump hailed the strikes, claiming the facilities were “obliterated.” However, nuclear experts and international monitors are now faced with a far more complex reality. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), tasked with tracking Iran’s nuclear activity, is struggling to verify what happened to Iran’s uranium reserves including over 400 kilograms of material enriched to 60%, just short of weapons-grade levels.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has indicated that while Iran's advanced centrifuges at Fordow may have sustained heavy damage, the fate of the enriched uranium is unclear. The deeply fortified underground facility was a central hub for Iran’s most sensitive enrichment work, making any assessment or recovery of material exceptionally difficult in the aftermath of the bombing.
According to intelligence sources and nuclear policy experts, the chaos following the strikes may have offered Iran the perfect opportunity to relocate part of its stockpile undetected. Some satellite imagery reportedly shows truck convoys departing from the Fordow site shortly before the attack, prompting speculation that Tehran may have anticipated the airstrikes and preemptively moved crucial materials.
IAEA officials revealed that Iran had informed the agency on June 13 the day Israeli strikes began that it was implementing measures to safeguard its equipment and inventory. While no specifics were shared, the timing raised eyebrows among Western diplomats. One senior official privately noted that it appeared “almost as if they knew the attacks were imminent.”
Despite assertions from Trump dismissing the idea that uranium was relocated calling such a move “very dangerous and very difficult” many in the non-proliferation community remain unconvinced. The sheer weight and volatility of enriched uranium make it logistically challenging to move swiftly, but not impossible.
Former IAEA inspector Olli Heinonen warned that verifying the location and condition of the uranium will be a drawn-out process. “Some of the material may be inaccessible, lost beneath debris, or potentially dispersed,” he said. “Environmental sampling, forensics, and structural analysis will all be required.”
Western intelligence estimates that Iran’s 60% enriched uranium, if further refined, could yield enough material for up to nine nuclear warheads. Even partial loss or concealment of that stockpile would present a major proliferation risk.
Before the airstrikes, Iran’s enrichment activities were monitored around the clock under the safeguards of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the post-strike scenario has rendered those safeguards virtually inoperative. With buildings reduced to rubble and cooperation from Iran now in doubt, the IAEA’s visibility has been dramatically reduced.
Iran’s parliament has since voted to suspend cooperation with the IAEA, expressing outrage over what it describes as the agency’s failure to prevent the strikes which many states consider violations of international law. Tehran blames a recent IAEA Board resolution for laying diplomatic groundwork for the attacks.
Though Iran maintains its nuclear program is purely civilian, enrichment levels reaching 60% far exceed the requirements for peaceful use, which typically demand only 3–5% purity. This raises international concerns, especially as Iran has refused full transparency at several undeclared sites where unexplained uranium particles were previously discovered.
The IAEA also confirmed that Iran possesses additional centrifuges at undisclosed locations, adding to the uncertainty. Without unrestricted access, inspectors face the prospect of navigating what one diplomat described as a “game of cat and mouse,” similar to the WMD search in Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion.
Another major obstacle is the scale of damage inflicted on inspection infrastructure itself. At Natanz, one of the smaller enrichment facilities, IAEA sources believe parts of the stockpile may have been destroyed. But the situation at Fordow and the Isfahan storage complex remains opaque. Isfahan, in particular, houses one of Iran’s most enriched caches and was severely hit, including tunnel entrances critical to storage vaults.
The IAEA has not been able to reenter the affected sites since the strikes began. Director Grossi recently stated that unexploded ordnance and structural instability pose significant safety risks for any return mission, meaning verification efforts may be delayed indefinitely.
Arms control experts emphasize that even if small quantities of 60% enriched uranium remain unaccounted for, the threat cannot be dismissed. “These materials represent a serious risk if diverted or repurposed,” said Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association. “And if Iran’s centrifuges are intact and hidden, a new clandestine enrichment facility could be built.”
Although intelligence-sharing among allied nations continues, the IAEA insists it relies solely on independently verifiable data. The agency is now under pressure to maintain transparency about what it can and cannot confirm.
As the world grapples with the implications of these strikes, the shadow of uncertainty deepens. Until every gram of enriched uranium is accounted for, global non-proliferation efforts face a precarious test one fraught with suspicion, high-stakes diplomacy, and the lingering fear that the materials fueling the next crisis may already be out of sight.