Trump’s Miscalculation on India: By Slapping Punitive Tariffs That Eclipse Even His China Strategy, Washington Has Mistaken New Delhi for a Weaker Player Yet the Fallout Now Risks Eroding Decades of US India Goodwill, Strengthening India’s National Resolve, and Pushing the World’s Fifth-Largest Economy Further Toward Strategic Autonomy.
When former President Donald Trump slapped a 50% tariff followed by an additional 25% duty on Indian goods this week, the move was widely perceived in New Delhi as more than just economic policy. It was an act of political coercion, a blunt message that America could pressure India into alignment on global conflicts, particularly the Ukraine war. Yet, the strategy has backfired. By assuming India is a softer target than China, Trump has underestimated both India’s leverage and its national psyche.
Washington has sought to justify the tariffs as a response to India’s continued purchase of Russian oil. But this reasoning has not convinced policymakers or the public in India. The glaring contradiction is evident: China, the world’s largest buyer of Russian oil, faces no such penalties. If the intent is to weaken Moscow’s revenue stream, targeting New Delhi achieves little. Instead, it reinforces the impression that America is playing a selective, even hypocritical, game of economic punishment.
For Indians, the tariffs are not just about trade; they cut deeper. They are seen as an assault on sovereignty and dignity, evoking memories of external powers dictating terms. What was once a vibrant strategic partnership between India and the US, nurtured painstakingly over two decades, now risks being undone by a short-sighted reliance on punitive duties.
Trump’s advisers, dubbed the “tariff trio” in Indian media, appear to have convinced him that New Delhi could be pressured because its trade volume with the US is modest compared to China’s. This is a serious miscalculation. India is not merely a trading partner it is a civilisational state, an economy among the world’s top five, and a key player in the Indo-Pacific balance of power. Tariffs may bite traders and exporters, but politically they have only hardened India’s resolve to chart an independent path.
The Indian government, across party lines, is now rallying around the principle that economic blackmail cannot dictate foreign policy. Public opinion, too, is shifting rapidly, with small and medium businesses openly advocating for alternative supply chains that reduce dependence on American markets.
If Trump and his team had studied India’s experience with China, they might have approached this differently. The 2020 Ladakh clashes left deep scars, erasing decades of trust and goodwill. While incremental rapprochement has taken place since 2024, Indian public opinion remains wary of Beijing, with surveys showing overwhelming suspicion among the youth.
In contrast, the United States had, until recently, enjoyed goodwill. Indian youth consistently saw Washington as the most trusted global partner, a counterbalance to China. By weaponizing tariffs, Trump risks squandering this strategic advantage. Unlike China, America had no history of direct conflict with India; instead, it had been a collaborator in defence, technology, and Indo-Pacific strategy. That hard-earned goodwill is now eroding at speed.
The reliance on tariffs as a blunt foreign policy weapon exposes the limits of Trump’s playbook. This was a tactic of the 20th century, when the US could strong-arm weaker economies into compliance. But in today’s multipolar world, such tactics appear outdated and counterproductive. India, with its rising global stature, does not see itself as a junior partner to be disciplined, but as an equal stakeholder in shaping world order.
By trying to corner New Delhi, Trump has inadvertently accelerated India’s diversification of energy, trade partners, and strategic alignments. Russia, the Gulf states, Europe, and even Southeast Asia may become more prominent in India’s economic architecture as it resists being boxed in by tariffs.
What Trump’s tariff war fails to recognise is the symbolic cost. For India, this dispute is no longer about markets or customs duties it is about sovereignty, self-respect, and the right to make independent choices in a fractured world. The damage is not just economic but political, and once trust is broken, it may take years, even decades, to repair.
In the end, the miscalculation lies not in numbers but in assumptions. India is not China, but neither is it pliable. By mistaking firmness for weakness, Trump has turned a friendly partner into a wary negotiator. And in a century defined by shifting alliances and multipolarity, that may prove to be America’s costliest mistake yet.