Azerbaijan’s recent accusations that India blocked its bid to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization highlight a deeper issue in Baku’s foreign policy: by prioritizing a close relationship with Pakistan, Azerbaijan risks antagonizing India, a key regional partner. Analysts suggest that instead of blaming India for alleged setbacks, Azerbaijan should reflect on how its strategic choices particularly defense and political alignment with Pakistan have complicated ties with New Delhi and limited its diplomatic leverage in Eurasian multilateral forums.
Azerbaijan’s recent complaints about India allegedly blocking its bid to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) reflect a deeper misreading of regional dynamics and the consequences of its foreign policy choices. President Ilham Aliyev’s remarks, reportedly made during a meeting with Pakistan’s leadership, framed India’s position as “revenge” while celebrating Islamabad’s “victory” over New Delhi. Yet, Baku would do well to pause and reflect: close ties with Pakistan should not automatically translate into antagonism toward India.
Historical context sheds light on the current impasse. India recognized Azerbaijan soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, yet diplomatic engagement remained slow. Embassies opened years apart, high-level visits have been rare, and substantive political dialogue has lagged behind economic and strategic opportunities. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan prioritized ties with Pakistan, deepening military cooperation, joint exercises, and arms purchases including a $1.6 billion deal for JF-17C Block-III warplanes while publicly aligning with Islamabad on sensitive issues like Kashmir. These actions naturally complicated relations with India.
India, in contrast, has consistently demonstrated strategic patience and maturity. Despite close relations with Armenia and awareness of Azerbaijan’s alignment with Pakistan, India has avoided provocative statements, refraining from taking sides in regional conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh. Even when confronted with Baku’s anti-India rhetoric, India maintained its neutrality, focusing on long-term economic and diplomatic benefits rather than public tit-for-tat.
The economic and strategic dividends of India-Azerbaijan ties have been substantial. Bilateral trade grew from USD 50 million in 2005 to USD 958 million in 2024, heavily favoring Azerbaijan, while Indian investment in the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil fields and the BTC pipeline exceeds USD 1.2 billion. Indian tourists contribute significantly to Azerbaijan’s economy, while cultural exchanges, including Bollywood, enhance bilateral goodwill. Yet, despite these benefits, Azerbaijan’s continued emphasis on Pakistan as the primary partner undermines its broader regional interests.
If India has indeed expressed reservations about Azerbaijan’s SCO membership, it would be a predictable outcome of Baku’s own policy choices. Consensus-driven multilateral blocs rarely accommodate members who display consistent antagonism toward other participants. Before pointing fingers, Azerbaijan would be wise to undertake serious soul-searching: prioritizing Pakistan over India may be politically symbolic, but it comes at a tangible cost.
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, as current developments show, requires recalibration. Emphasizing balance, regional cooperation, and strategic foresight, rather than reflexive alignment with Pakistan, would serve its national interests far better than repeated public rebukes of India. Until such a recalibration occurs, Baku’s frustrations within multilateral forums will continue to mirror its own diplomatic miscalculations.